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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper a new approach to Intellectual Property 
Management and Protection (IPMP) of multimedia content 
streams is proposed. The innovative feature of the 
approach is that the protection procedure is associated, 
embedded and downloaded with the protected content that 
is “consumed” on standard terminals. Such an approach 
thus enables terminal interoperability, which is one of the 
main obstacles to the deployment of “secure” terminals. 
The approach takes its origin from the successful 
experiences in the standardization of toolsets for audio 
synthesis and processing in the framework of the Moving 
Picture Experts Group (MPEG). The approach is in course 
of development together with a prototype implementation 
in the framework of the IST project MOSES (MPEG Open 
Security for Embedded Systems). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, network infrastructures are starting to be used 
to support the commercialization of multimedia content as 
they are for many other commodities, like cars, domestic 
appliances and food. In fact, while the actual transactions 
for purchasing the goods can take place over a network 
infrastructure, like the Internet, the purchased items are 
physically delivered to the customers by traditional means 
(except for software). Examples of this approach are big 
on-line media stores like Amazon.com and other similar 
initiatives that have appeared in many countries, and which 
are gradually expanding their scope starting from book 
selling to include retailing of music on CD. 
On one hand, it is clear that transactions of non-
material goods, like books, videos, music, still images and 
any other type of mono-media or multi-media information 
share a number of peculiar qualities that are strongly in 
favor of their migration from traditional physical delivery 
technologies to an all-electronic delivery model: they can 
be digitized, stored, compressed and transferred on-line. 
On the other hand, in recent years consumers have been 
very reluctant to endorse this model used by market 
operators, especially content production companies. This 
attitude has shown not only as regards the Internet but also 
with respect to long established techniques for delivering 
digital audio-visual content, like the digital compact disk 
in the DVD version. This is mainly due to the fact that the 
same features that make the distribution and management 
of digital content so easy are also responsible for the 
difficulties of selling it on-line. Digital information as it is 
can be easily copied an unlimited number of times and 
transferred to an unlimited number of people. 
Content protection of digital items has therefore 
become a major issue. On one hand content has to be 
protected so that access to it is enabled only to those who 
have acquired the right to do so, and on the other it has to 
be protected from uncontrolled dissemination. 
One solution to this problem has been the 
development of proprietary “Intellectual Property” (IP) 
protection systems; but although they can be very effective 
for the specific platforms they are conceived for, they 
introduce significant interoperability limitations when 
trying to access the content using different devices. 
In this case, interoperability among different 
manufacturers’ products is of crucial importance in 
providing consumers with the easiest access to content. 
This paper shows how the proposed approach is able 
to provide an effective way to securely handle multimedia 
content and at the same time to support two kinds of 
interoperability: 
1. enable the same protected content to be consumed 
on different vendors’ devices.  
2. enable the same content to be protected by different 
vendors’ IPMP tools.  
The first step is the definition of a high-level meta-
language for IPMP tool description. The core of such a 
language shall be a library of IPMP-primitives able to 
provide all the range of functionality required during 
content consumption. The standardization of such libraries 
will define the “normative” behaviour of any standard 
platform with no constraints on the implementation. 
The interpreted nature of the suggested approach will 
allow on the one side an implementation-independent 
method of complexity evaluation and on the other 
interoperability among different technologies. This is 
achieved through different Virtual Machine (VM) binary 
codes running on the different platforms, but processing 
exactly the same IPMP information. 
The interesting features of the approach described in 
this paper have been recognized by the MPEG committee 
by adding in the MPEG-4 IPMP draft one extension 
currently in development based on the structured 
description of IPMP tools described here. 
 
 
 
 
  
2. STRUCTURED IPMP TOOLS  
 
The idea of performing signal processing by means of an 
interpreted language has been already successfully 
exploited in the computer music community and brought to 
a multimedia international standard. In fact, the MPEG-4 
Audio standard provides a toolset for synthetic Audio 
generation and Audio processing called Structured Audio 
(SA). SA permits the description of algorithms by means 
of the Structured Audio Orchestra Language (SAOL) 
programming language [3]. SAOL allows sound synthesis 
and process through instruments described as a network of 
primitives.  
Following the essential idea behind SA, this paper 
outlines the proposal to define a meta-language based on a 
set of IPMP-primitives able to describe the widest range of 
content protection mechanisms including as a subset those 
deployed by the multimedia industry. Moreover, this 
language should be as flexible as possible in order to 
support the largest number of future techniques. For 
example, the core primitives shall be able to provide 
functionality needed when performing cryptographic 
algorithms. In case of asymmetric encryption/decryption, a 
RSA algorithm would be described in terms of a sequence 
of primitives (that henceforth will be called IPMP 
instrument) for receiving the cipher text as input and 
providing the plaintext as output after having retrieved the 
private key securely stored within the terminal or securely 
downloaded. 
Every IPMP tool can be described by this language 
either as a single IPMP instrument or as a set of 
instruments composing an IPMP orchestra. The textual 
description shall then be formalized in terms of normative 
byte code defining the exact behaviour the terminal shall 
have in order to correctly process the information received. 
This implies that a given description of an IPMP 
instrument shall correspond to a unique byte code and that 
the entity interpreting the byte code has a corresponding 
unique normative behaviour. Its presence in any compliant 
terminal allows different developers to exchange IPMP 
tools without risk of incompatibility. Since the main task 
of this component will be to handle and coordinate the 
execution of several jobs at precise moments in time, 
hereafter it will be called a/the scheduler. Figure 1 shows 
how the textual description of an IPMP tool needs to be 
translated into a byte code in order to be downloaded into 
the terminal and executed by the normative scheduler. 
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Figure 1. Tool description parsing, compiling and download 
into the terminal. 
No implementation constraints are thus necessary 
except those concerning the secure implementation of the 
core execution engine of the VM. Any interpreter can be 
implemented with any available technology according to 
the business model for the content distribution it is 
conceived for, or according to the trade-off between 
security and implementation effort (costs). 
The ability to describe IPMP tools in terms of sets of 
basic primitives employed a certain number of times 
during tool use will provide an implementation-
independent method of complexity evaluation. In order to 
achieve meaningful measurements a complexity vector (i.e. 
a set of basic primitives or classes of primitives) can be 
flexibly defined according to the profiling needed. Every 
element of this vector will be a counter of the number of 
times a primitive (or primitives belonging to a class of 
primitives) is used. Complexity will be quantified through 
the values of the different vector dimensions. Platform 
independent complexity measurements will provide a 
consistent set of profiles applicable to any terminal and 
thus uniquely defining portability constraints. 
 
3. DESCRIPTION OF TOOL RELATIONS 
 
Many current usage scenarios imply the concurrent use of 
different IPMP tools implemented by different vendors. 
For instance the multimedia content can be first decrypted 
and then signed through some watermarking techniques 
The different tools involved are likely to be handled by 
different delivery infrastructure and will then be described 
by independent IPMP orchestras. The normative scheduler 
installed in any compliant terminal will then properly 
handle and coordinate the parallel (or serial) execution of 
the different protection mechanisms in order to obtain the 
desired result. 
The authors propose that the behaviour of the 
scheduler during instantiation and execution of 
independent IPMP tools is formalized through a meta-
language that can be referred to as IPMP Scene 
Description Language similar to the already existent and 
deployed MPEG-4 Binary Format for Scene (BIFS). The 
scene description can be coded independently from the 
streams related to primitive media objects so that it will 
not be necessary to decode the objects in order to access 
and if necessary modify parameters describing the scene.  
In our view the different IPMP tools will play the role 
of BIFS nodes and their relationship will be described in 
terms of a hierarchical structure. Each node is linked to 
one or several other nodes in a non-static way. This means 
that node attributes can be changed while nodes can be 
added, replaced, or removed. This scenario further stresses 
the need for a normative scheduler able to coordinate the 
different IPMP tool instances running inside the virtual 
machine. The Open Platform Infrastructure for Multimedia 
Access (OPIMA) specification [1] seems to appropriately 
address this need by providing a starting point for the 
conception of this normative entity. Actually this 
architecture appears as the best candidate to interpret and 
  
execute languages oriented to secure multimedia content 
handling. Some modifications to its original specification 
are likely to become necessary in order to best fit the set of 
primitives that will be defined and thus provide the 
maximum degree of effectiveness. For instance, one of the 
main open issues of the OPIMA architecture is the 
definition of a standard secure interface between IPMP 
tools and the terminal. An answer to this problem is 
provided by the MPEG IPMP Extensions (IPMPX) 
specification that standardizes a messaging interface 
allowing inter-IPMP tools and tools-terminal 
communication. An appropriate integration of the two 
solutions when implementing a prototype Structured IPMP 
decoder is currently going on within MOSES. This will 
hopefully represent the first answer to the need for an open 
and flexible framework for secure digital multimedia 
content handling.  
As for tools description, scene description has to be 
formalized in a unique byte code to be downloaded into 
the terminal. Again, only the behaviour of the normative 
interpreter processing the scene description shall be 
standardized. No implementation constraints will be 
necessary since the different implementations will 
exclusively provide a standard input-output relation (a 
given description corresponds to a given byte code). Such 
description will allow the content vendor to exactly specify 
the way its property has to be used according to its favorite 
business models. A schematic of this scenario is shown in 
figure 2. 
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Figure 2 A process of content consumption may require several 
interoperating IPMP tools. 
 
4. TOOLS RUN-TIME CONTROL 
 
Once an IPMP instrument has been described in its 
functionality and placed in the correct place inside the 
scene, it has to be configured and used in the right way. 
This goal can be achieved by means of a score language 
providing information concerning: the exact time in which 
a particular IPMP instrument has to be instantiated; the 
duration of its performance (or the exact time in which it 
has to be terminated); the parameters needed for 
initialization. 
For instance, if a process of content consumption 
requires the interaction with a remote IPMP tool, we can 
imagine that through a score event an IPMP instrument is 
instantiated and configured according to configuration 
parameters provided by the content vendor or trusted third 
parties. Then the instrument produces the appropriate 
message to be sent and stops. The remote tool, once the 
message is received, produces the answer and a score 
event aimed at activating the IPMP instrument instance 
recipient of the message. This provides an asynchronous 
mechanism of IPMP tool interaction. 
By means of a score language like this access to some 
control variables inside the different IPMP instruments 
will be possible. Such control points are a sort of exposed 
(i.e. accessible for modification) variable that provide an 
additional description of the scene. This feature provides a 
powerful run-time tuning mechanism.  
A score is a list of commands. A command performs a 
single action at a moment in time, such as changing the 
value of an exposed field or creating a new instance of an 
IPMP instrument (providing the set-up settings). The 
instantiation of a new IPMP tool only requires that the byte 
code related to the new tool description has already been 
downloaded into the terminal. 
 
5. AN EXAMPLE OF STRUCTURED IPMP TOOL  
 
A very simple example is provided in figure 3 so as to 
better illustrate the idea of IPMP tools structured 
description. 
RSA 
 
Algorithm: Key generation for RSA public-key encryption 
SUMMARY: each entity creates an RSA public key and a corresponding private key. 
Each entity A should do the following: 
1. Generate two large random (and distinct) primes p and q each roughly the same 
size. 
2. Compute n= pq and φ  =(p-1)(q-1). 
3. Select a random integer e, 1<e<φ, such that gcd(e,φ)=1. 
4. Used the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique integer d, 1<d<φ, 
such that ed≡1 (modφ). 
5. A’s public key is (n,e); A’s private key is d. 
 
Algorithm: RSA public-key encryption 
SUMMARY: B encrypt a message m for A, which A decrypts. 
1. Encryption. B should do the following: 
a. Obtain A’s authentic public key (n,e). 
b. Represent the message as an integer m in the interval [0, n-1]. 
c. Compute c=m e mod n 
d. Send the ciphertext c to A. 
2. Decryption. To recover plaintext m from c, A should do the following: 
a. Use the private key d to recover m=c d mod n. 
 
 
RSA_Key_Generation(int KEY_LENGTH) 
{ 
 
bit(KEY_LENGHT/2)  p, q; 
bit(KEY_LENGHT)   d, e, n, φ ; 
  
while (p == q)) 
{ 
while(!is_prime(p)) 
   p = select_random_pow2(1,KEY_LENGTH/2); 
while(!is_prime(q)) 
   q = select_random_pow2(1,KEY_LENGTH/2); 
 } 
 φ=mul_big((p-1), (q-1)) 
 while(gcd(φ ,e) != 1) ) 
e= select_random_pow2(1, φ); 
 d=gcd_ext(φ ,e,a,b); 
 n=p*q 
return (n,e,d); 
} 
 
RSA_Encryption(bit[] m, bit[] e, bit[] n, int KEY_LENGTH) 
{ 
 
bit(KEY_LENGTH) c; 
 c=exp_mod(m,e,n); 
 return(c); 
} 
 
RSA_Decryption(bit[] c, bit[] d, bit[] n, int KEY_LENGTH) 
{ 
 
bit(KEY_LENGTH) m; 
 m=exp_mod(c,d,n); 
 return (m) 
} 
 
Figure 3 Example of RSA algorithm described by means of the 
structured IPMP approach. 
  
The described tool performs the RSA (named after its 
inventors R. Rivest, A. Shamir, L. Adelman) public-key 
encryption algorithm. In bold are functions that could 
belong to the primitive instructions set to be defined. The 
description is taken from [4] where the necessary keys are 
generated and then used to encrypt and decrypt the 
sensible content. 
The description of the RSA algorithm provided here 
permit the definition of a first set of primitives that are 
likely to be inserted into the core library of functions: 
operations modulo a generic integer n (exp_mod), 
operations on great numbers (mul_big), operations on 
random and prime numbers (is_prime, 
select_random_pow2). The study and analysis of the 
widest range of currently used algorithms will assure the 
core primitives cover the largest variety of usage scenarios 
so as to be able to implement virtually any possible 
protection tool. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As the results of SA implementations have shown [2] 
[5] [6], the interpreted approach provides a consistent 
number of advantages that we summarize here. 
The structured tool description by means of a network 
of primitives can allow the implementation of the widest 
range of tools if the definition of the core set is appropriate 
and the language is flexible; it provides a simple way to 
redesign IPMP tools once they could become 
untrustworthy because of implementation flaws or 
algorithm intrinsic weaknesses; in case of remote tools it 
does not need the protected content to exit the terminal 
since any structured IPMP tool is downloadable and the 
only data transfer involved is that concerning the byte code 
download; it allows a precise complexity evaluation in 
terms of number of basic instruction to be performed per 
time-frame and thus implementation independent. These 
complexity measurements lead to a precise definition of 
terminals in terms of processing capabilities. 
The scene description in terms of dedicated language 
provides a simple way to describe the interaction between 
different IPMP tools even after the content consumption 
has started; since it is coded in textual format and 
downloaded as normative byte code, it requires a low bit-
rate data exchange with the terminal, keeping any sensible 
information inside the trusted compartment; it implies the 
definition of a normative behaviour for the entity 
supervising the overall execution with no constraint about 
the implementation. 
The tool configuration by means of a dedicated score 
language allows the on-the-fly instantiation and (re)design 
of new IPMP tools through events generation and is 
appropriate for a precise and direct control of IPMP tools 
performances thanks to the exposed fields mechanism. 
It may be argued that there is no need to have a new 
language to define structured descriptions of IPMP tools 
and a language such as Java could be employed for such 
goal. In reality there are several advantages in defining an 
appropriate language in conjunction with an appropriate 
scheduler (OPIMA [1]):  
The simplicity of the language allows us to accurately 
takie into account the widest range of possible security 
issues (something that is not possible – or unfeasible – 
with a general purpose language like Java);  
The specific libraries and functions can be 
implemented through optimized native code routines or 
exploiting already existent hardware accelerators; 
The security of the VM can be achieved through the 
latest techniques of secure software production [7], the 
deployment of technologies for binary code protection 
such as the “Tamper Resistant Coding” [8] or using secure 
hardware components (crypto accelerators, secure storage 
devices etc.). 
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